Model teorije igara za promociju, određivanje cijena i upravljanje zalihama u lancu opskrbe

Krstić, Jakov (2014) Model teorije igara za promociju, određivanje cijena i upravljanje zalihama u lancu opskrbe. Diploma thesis, Faculty of Science > Department of Mathematics.

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss how the manufacturer and its retailers react on the market in order to maximize their individual net profits, in the case when the VMI supply chain is arranged between them. The manufacturer produces and supplies a single finished product at the same wholesale price to multiple retailers. The retailers sell the product in dispersed and independent markets. The demand for the finished product in each market is an increasing and concave function of the advertising investments of the manufacturer and the retailers, but decreasing and convex function of the retail price. The manufacturer makes decisions about the wholesale price, advertising investments, replenishment cycles of the raw materials and finished product, and backorder quantity to maximize its profit. Retailers consider the manufacturers decisions and determine the optimal retail prices and advertisement investments to maximize their profits. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. We proposed an algorithm for computing the Stackelberg equilibrium. Also, we made a numerical analysis to demonstrate how the algorithm works and to understand how the equilibrium reacts when inputs are changed.

Item Type: Thesis (Diploma thesis)
Supervisor: Šorić, Kristina
Date: 2014
Number of Pages: 34
Subjects: NATURAL SCIENCES > Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Science > Department of Mathematics
Depositing User: Iva Prah
Date Deposited: 03 Jun 2015 12:18
Last Modified: 03 Jun 2015 12:18
URI: http://digre.pmf.unizg.hr/id/eprint/3993

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